The declared end of South Stream and why nobody seems to care.  CEPS Commentary, 5 December 2014 by Behrens, Arno
  
*With research assistance from Anna Dimitrova. Arno Behrens is Research Fellow and Head of the 
Energy research unit at CEPS. 
CEPS Commentaries offer concise, policy-oriented insights into topical issues in European affairs. 
The views expressed are attributable only to the author in a personal capacity and not to any 
institution with which he is associated. 
Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (www.ceps.eu)  © CEPS 2014 
Centre for European Policy Studies ▪ Place du Congrès 1 ▪ B-1000 Brussels ▪ Tel: (32.2) 229.39.11 ▪ www.ceps.eu 
The declared end of South Stream 
and why nobody seems to care 
Arno Behrens* 
5 December 2014 
 
ore than seven years after the South Stream pipeline project was first announced in 
June 2007, it finally seems to have been dropped by Russian President Vladimir 
Putin on his visit to Turkey this week. This CEPS Commentary looks at the ostensible 
reasons for President Putin’s decision as well as what’s potentially behind them. It concludes 
that the EU may actually benefit from this decision in being able to secure more gas with less 
political interference from Russia.  
The primary reason for abandoning the project stated in President Putin’s speech was that the 
European Commission had been “unconstructive”. “It’s not that the European Commission 
has helped to implement this project – it’s that we see obstacles being created in its 
implementation”.1 
He is referring to the insistence by the European Commission for participating member states 
to respect internal market legislation and thus to carry out their obligations associated with 
the EU acquis communautaire. In particular, the Commission called on member states to comply 
with the Third Energy Package and the associated Gas Directive, which has two central 
elements: the effective separation of networks from supply (‘unbundling’) and non-
discriminatory access by third parties to the infrastructure. 
Against this background, the Commission in December 2013 found that the Intergovernmental 
Agreements (IGAs) for the construction of South Stream between Russia on the one hand and 
Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Serbia and Slovenia on the other were all in 
breach of EU law inter alia regarding ‘unbundling’ and ‘third party access’. Serbia, as a member 
of the Energy Community, is obliged to implement EU energy regulation as well. As the result, 
the Commission concluded that all IGAs needed to be renegotiated. However, such a 
reopening of the agreements evidently proved unacceptable to Russia, which argued that EU 
rules did not apply to trans-boundary projects with non-EU countries. It was thus international 
law that governed EU-Russia relations, rendering the IGAs valid.  
In addition, the Commission opened an infringement procedure against Bulgaria for failing to 
implement rules on public procurement, which subsequently stopped construction activities 
                                                   
1 http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/23322 
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in June 2014. This meant that Bulgaria has made a decision to respect the rules of the internal 
market.  
With his announcement of last week and the ‘threat’ to work on the construction of the pipeline 
by another route through Turkey, President Putin may have tried to divide the EU on the 
South Stream project ahead of the energy minister’s meeting in Brussels on December 9th. 
However, fears that such a potential ‘bluff’ might divide EU member states over this issue 
were dispelled by Commission President Juncker after a meeting with Bulgarian Prime 
Minister Borisov on Thursday, December 4th, when he declared that “we will not accept any 
blackmailing on energy matters”.  
Although the legal arguments may have played a role in President Putin’s decision, it may 
actually have been the economic arguments that gave the final blow to the project. Although 
it has been argued that with the Russian economy on the brink of recession, oil prices at their 
lowest levels in the past five years and the Russian ruble continuing to lose ground it becomes 
increasingly difficult for Russia to finance projects as expensive as South Stream, such relative 
short- to medium-term considerations tend not to be grounds for terminating a project, 
certainly not in such an abrupt fashion. The real economic blow to the project originates from 
the fact that EU gas demand may never recover to the pre-crisis levels of 2008. In fact, from 
2007 (the year that South Stream was announced) until 2014, the International Energy Agency 
has revised downwards its EU gas demand forecasts for the year 2030 by 18%.2 
For the EU, all of this might actually be good news. While the Nabucco pipeline failed for a 
lack of sufficient gas supplies, South Stream may have failed largely because EU energy 
legislation was consequently applied against anti-competitive practices. These examples also 
show that commercially viable projects tend to be more successful than political ones. This is 
part of the reason why the Trans-Adriatic-Pipeline (TAP) bringing Azeri gas through Turkey 
to Greece and Italy is the only pipeline project currently left of the ‘southern gas corridor’. 
Incidentally, on December 1st, TAP completed the market test showing that it can 
accommodate demand for capacity in full compliance with applicable regulation.  
Finally, the EU must now rethink its strategy for the ‘southern gas corridor’, which presents 
the opportunity to find new alternatives in view of a real diversification – both in sources and 
in routes. Such a strategy could constitute a compromise between the Nabucco approach and 
the South Stream projects in the sense that it could combine both non-Russian and Russian gas 
sources. There are plenty of options for non-Russian supplies, including from the Caspian 
region, the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean. At the same time, Russian Gazprom 
and Turkish Botas have just agreed to convey 50 billion cubic metres of natural gas to the 
Turkish-Greek border.3 In such a ‘South Stream light’ scenario, the EU may benefit from the 
possibility to build its own much-needed gas interconnectors in southeastern Europe without 
political interference from Russia, while ensuring that enough gas is available to fill them. 
                                                   
2 Comparing projections for 2030 in the Alternative Policy Scenario of the IEA World Energy Outlook 
2007 with projections in the New Policies Scenario of the IEA World Energy Outlook 2014. 
3 http://www.gazprom.com/press/news/2014/december/article208505/ 
